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Deontic sentences, possible worlds
and norms 
Jan Woleński
 
1 Deontic sentences and deontic systems 
1 Deontic  sentences  are  sentences  of  the  form “it  is  obligatory  (forbidden,  permitted,
indifferent)  that  A”,  where  A stands  for  a  sentence  describing  an  action  which  is
obligatory (forbidden, permitted, indifferent). It must be stressed that deontic sentences
are declarative sentences, i.e.  they are true or false. Hence, if one maintains that the
bearers of logical values are not sentences but propositions, he can speak about deontic
propositions. In the last part of this paper I shall come back to the notion of deontic
proposition. 
2 From the logical point of view, a deontic sentence is a compound sentence consisting of a
unary  deontic  operator  (it  is  obligatory,  forbidden,  permitted,  indifferent)  and  its
argument — that is, a sentence A about human actions. Now, let “O”, “F”, “P”, “I” denote
respectively: it is obligatory that, it is forbidden (prohibited) that, it is permitted that and
it is indifferent that. With those conventions, we can symbolize the particular forms of
deontic sentences as formulas: OA, FA, PA, IA. 
3 Any deontic operator from the set {O, F, P, I} may be used as deontic primitive. If we take “
O” as the primitive, we have the following conceptual connections:
FA =def. O not-A 
PA =def. not-O not-A 
IA =def. I not-A =def. not-OA and not-O not-A 
4 The  permission  operator  P is  here  understood  as  expressing  the  so-called  “weak
permission”, i.e. the negation of the prohibition — it is permitted that P means that it is
not a case that A is forbidden. It is also possible to interpret the notion of permission in
another way, but throughout this paper “PA” will be treated as the weak permission.1
Deontic sentences, possible worlds and norms
Revus, 34 | 2018
5 The definitions of deontic operators show that every deontic sentence can be expressed
with the aid of an O-operator. 
6 The logical  behaviour  of  deontic  operators  is  regulated by a  special  branch of  logic,
deontic logic. There are many systems of deontic logic. The simplest one, sufficient for
my  aims,  is  Georg  Henrik  von  Wright’s  standard  deontic  system  (SDS),  i.e.  the
propositional monadic deontic calculus.2
7 The vocabulary of SDS contains: sentential variables, sentential connectives (namely, “~”
for negation, “∧” for conjunction, “∨” for disjunction, “⇒” for implication, and “⇔” for
equivalence), unary deontic operator (O) and brackets. The sentential formulas without
deontic operators are defined as in sentential calculus. 
8 Let “A”, “B”, “C” be metalinguistic variables ranging over sentential formulas (without
deontic  operators)  and  “D”,  “E”  be  metalinguistic  variables  ranging  over  deontic
formulas. Let “L” denote the language of SDS. The definition of well-formed formula of L
may be presented in the following manner:
1. If A is a sentential formula, then OA is a well-formed formula of L.
2. If D and E are well-formed formulas of L, then ~D, D ∧ E, D ∨ E, D ⇒ E, and D ⇔ E are
also well-formed formulas of L.
3. Only those formulas are well-formed formulas of L, which are defined by
conditions 1 and 2. 
9 Note that the definition of well-formed formula excludes from L iterated formulas (e.g.
OOA) and mixed formulas (e.g. OA ∧ A). 
10 The axiom-schemes of SDS are: 
I. axiom-schemes of sentential calculus written in L, 
II. specific deontic axiom-schemes:
II.a OA ⇒ ~O~A 
II.b O(A ∧ B) ⇔ OA ∧ OB 
II.c O(A∨ ~A) 
11 SDS is based on modus ponens as the sole rule of inference.3
12 Now, we are prepared to formulate an important notion — the notion of deontic system.
Let “X” denote the finite, consistent (i.e. Cn(X) ≠ L, where “Cn” stands for consequence
operation), independent (i.e. for any D ∈ X, Cn(X – {D}) ⊆ Cn(X)) and non-tautological (i.e.
the intersection of X and the set of theorems of SDS is empty) set of O-sentences. The
deontic system is a (non-tautological) set of all logical consequences of X, i.e. the set Cn(X
); the notion of consequence operation is here relativized to SDS.4
 
2 Semantics for deontic language 
13 The semantic ideas of Saul Kripke are a very suitable tool for the analysis of deontic logic
and deontic language.5 A deontic model structure M is an ordered triple <K, Wr, R>, where
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K is a non-empty set of possible worlds, Wr is the distinguished element of K (the real or
actual  world)  and  R is  binary,  non-reflexive  relation  on  K (relation  of  deontic
alternativeness):
M = <K, Wr, R>
14 A deontic model M is a deontic model structure together with valuation function V from
Vr (the set of sentential variables) to {1,0}, i.e. the set of logical values. Thus, a deontic
model is the ordered pair <M, V>:
M = <M, V>
15 The valuation function V assigns a definite logical value 1 (truth) or 0 (falsity) to any
variable from Vr in worlds from K. V may be extended in the well-known way to function
from the set of all sentential formulas to the set {1,0}. Further, I shall suppose that this
extension has been done. 
16 Now, we must define the valuation function V for deontic formulas. To do so, we can
apply ideas from alethic modal logic, where truth of □A (it is necessary that A) in the real
world Wr is defined as truth of A in every world W such that WRWr and truth of ◊A (it is
possible that A) in the real world Wr as truth of A in some world W such that WRWr; of
course, R is here the relation of alethic alternativeness. Intuitively speaking, a sentence A
is a necessary truth in the real world Wr if and only if A is true in all worlds alternative to
the real world, and sentence A is possibly true in the real world Wr if and only if A is true
in  some world  alternative  to  the  real  world.  Obvious  analogies  between alethic  and
deontic operators (necessity with obligation and possibility with permission) motivate
the following semantic conditions:
V(OA, Wr) = 1, if and only if, for any W ∈ K such that WRWr, V(A, W) = 1 
V(PA, Wr) = 1, if and only if, for some W ∈ K such that WRWr, V(A, W) = 1 
17 From definitions of prohibition and indifference we have:
V(FA, Wr) = 1, if and only if, for every W ∈ K such that WRWr, V(A, W) = 0
V(IA, Wr) = 1, if and only if, for some W1 ∈ K such that W1RWr, V(A, W) = 1 and for some
W2 ∈ K such that W2RWr, V(A, W2) = 0. 
18 The intuitive content of semantic conditions for formulas with deontic operators can be
described in a similar way as in the case of alethic modalities. As we have said above, Wr is
the real or actual world. Now, all possible worlds W, such that WRWr, can be termed as
deontic alternatives to Wr or postulated worlds with respect to Wr. If OA is true (holds) in
the real world, then deontic alternatives to the real world are worlds in which obligation
expressed by OA is realized. And if some set X of O-sentences in Wr holds, i.e. in Wr all
sentences from X hold, then the postulated worlds with respect to Wr are such worlds in
which  all  obligations  from  X are  realized.  Hence,  the  deontic  alternatives  can  be
considered as possible realizations of obligations holding in the real world. Clearly, in
deontic alternatives no prohibited action can be realized. Consequently, if FA is true in
the real world, A must be false in all deontic alternatives to Wr. If IA holds in the real
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world, then in some postulated world in respect to Wr, A is true and in some A is false,
because  a  realization and restraining  from realization of  indifferent  action does  not
violate the obligations holding in Wr.  From definition of P-operator it follows that an
action A is permitted, if A is obligatory or indifferent and, hence, the semantic condition
for permission is an adequate claim. The real world is not a postulated one — we must
suppose (from a purely logical point of view) that some obligations are violated in Wr. It
justifies the non-transitiveness of R. Note that R can have different additional properties.
If R is only non-transitive, then M is SDS-structure; in other cases (R is symmetric etc., but
always non-transitive) we obtain other model structures and other deontic logics.6
 
3 What are norms?
19 But what does it mean to say that a deontic sentence, say OA, holds in the actual world?
Evidently, the truth or falsity of OA must be relativized to a norm that states that action A
is obligatory. As a consequence, deontic sentences and sets of deontic sentences are true
or false in the real world Wr in respect to some code (legal, moral, or otherwise). In this
way, in our conceptual scheme there appears new entities — norms. But what are norms?
Answers to this question diverge widely and form different theories of norms.7 First,
norms are considered as linguistic entities, inscriptions or meanings of inscriptions —
this  theory  can  be  named  “the  linguistic  theory  of  norms”.  Second,  norms  may  be
regarded  as  regularities  of  behaviour,  described  in  sociological  or/and  psychological
vocabulary — it is “the naturalistic theory of norms”. Third, norms may be defined as
ideal duties — this theory can be baptized as “the Platonistic theory of norms”. And, of
course, there are also many mixed theories, which regard norms as compound ontological
structures, for example meanings plus psychical facts. Each theory is contained within a
wide philosophical context related to all  areas of philosophy, especially ontology and
epistemology.
20 My philosophical preferences go against cognitivistic naturalism (the naturalistic theory)
and cognitivistic objectivism (the Platonistic theory). The mixed theories are also hard to
accept  because  they  are  based  on  a  rather  obscure  ontology.  Because  the  minimal
adequacy condition, according to my preferences, for a correct theory of norms is non-
cognitivism, I cannot accept the linguistic theory in the following form: norms are true or
false  sentences  (the  linguistic  cognitivism).  As  a  result  of  the  above-mentioned
elimination  there  remains  only  linguistic  non-cognitivism,  the  view  that  can  be
condensed to the following statement:  norms are linguistic entities,  strictly speaking,
sentences in a grammatical sense, but norms are neither true, nor false; logical values
cannot predicate about norms. They are sentences of a special semiotic sort; expressions
without cognitive meaning, but with an emotive, prescriptive, persuasive one. I think that
basic intuitions of linguistic non-cognitivism are right, but this theory is met with two
serious objections. First, if norms are considered as linguistic entities, then the problem
of semantics and the logic of norms appears. The strong reason for a logical theory of
norms is concerned with speaking about such relations between norms as: consistency,
entailment etc. Without a logic of norms, those relations are indefinite. But, all known
attempts to formulate a logic of norms must be appreciated as unsuccessful.8 Thus, there
is a real conflict between a need for speaking about logical relations between norms and a
lack of satisfactory logic and semantics of norms. This point was dramatically described
by Jørgen Jørgensen in the following way: 
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According to a  generally  accepted definition of  logical  inference only sentences
which are capable of being true or false, can function as premises or conclusions in
an inference;  nevertheless  it  seems evident  that  a  conclusion in  the imperative
mood may be  drawn two premises from one of  which or  both  of  which are  in
imperative mood.9 
21 Jørgensen’s argumentation,  commonly known as “the Jørgensen’s dilemma” explicitly
shows the above-mentioned conflict between informal speaking about “logical” relations
between norms and the absence of sufficient formal grounds for those relations. This
conflict may be also expressed in the conceptual scheme used in the present paper. If
deontic sentences hold in Wr relative to a given set of norms viewed as specific sentences,
then logical connections between deontic sentences must be based on logical connections
between norms, and deontic logic must be recurred to the logic of norms. Perhaps future
works concerning the logic of norms will be more successful than those to date. I am
rather pessimistic about this matter and my viewpoint is in total agreement with the
following quotation: 
In my opinion we are justified in saying that all these attempts to reconcile the
atheoretical thesis (i.e. non-cognitivistic thesis — J. W.) with adequate systems of
deontic  and  imperative  logic  fail  and,  moreover,  are  doomed  to  failure:  every
available evidence supports the view that we must appeal to the notion of truth in
the model when trying to understand and to articulate the logic of normative as
well  as  imperative  sentences  in  ordinary  discourse  —  the  notion  is  just  as
indispensable in the present field as it is in others.10 
Thus, if we want to retain non-cognitivism, we must refute the linguistic theory. 
22 The second objection is  concerned with some contexts  about  norms which are  non-
intuitive, if norms are considered as linguistic entities. We are speaking about the issuing,
adopting, following, or breaking of norms, but all these contexts are nonsensical when
applied  to  linguistic  objects.11 Speaking  otherwise,  the  words  “issuing”,  “adopting”,
“following”, “breaking” cannot be used properly, if norms are viewed as sentences —
“issuing (adopting,  following,  breaking)  of  a  sentence”  is  a  context  with a  category-
mistake. 
23 The above-mentioned difficulties  justified the need for  searching for  a  non-linguistic
theory of norms.
 
4 An intuitive analysis of normative regulation 
24 The aim and function of normative regulation (shortly — normation) is stating what is
obligatory, what is forbidden, and what is indifferent — the permitted sphere is a sum of
spheres: obligatory and indifferent. Normation is a process that results in a division of all
possible actions into three mutually disjoint sets: obligatory actions, forbidden actions,
and indifferent actions.12 It can be realized by defining a deontic system, i.e.  a set of
logical consequences of some set X, where X is a finite, consistent, independent, and non-
tautological  set  of  primary initial  obligations.  Defining X is  sufficient  for  a  complete
division of  all  possible actions in the three above-mentioned spheres.  The obligatory
sphere corresponds with all logical consequences of X. The forbidden sphere is related to
the set of all B’s, such that B = ~A and A belongs to Cn(X). The indifferent sphere consists of
all remaining actions. 
25 In the language of  sociology,  a  normation is  a  choice,  a  decision of  some normative
authority  —  for  example,  a  legal  sovereign  or  moral  reformer.  This  decision  is
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linguistically represented by a suitable set  of  deontic sentences and we can say that
sentences from this set form a description (practically partial) of the result of normation.
Thus,  in our informal analysis of  normation there appear only decisions and deontic
sentences. Now, we can identify norms with decisions and the latter are not, of course,
linguistic entities. In consequence, the sole linguistic element of our conceptual scheme is
deontic sentences. In this way, the second objection against the linguistic theory of norms
has no application considering that norms as decisions are not linguistic objects. I do not
deny  that  decisions  have  linguistic  counterparts,  but  we  must  strongly  distinguish
between a decision and its linguistic formulation. There is no necessity to equate decision
formulation with norm as  a  sentence  of  special  semantic  sort.  I  think that  the  best
approach to an explanation of semantic status of decision formulation is concerned with
the notion of performative utterance. Roughly speaking, the performative utterance “I
state that OA” expresses my normative decision that A is  obligatory.  It  is  possible to
understand the performative utterance “I state that OA” as indicative sentence and, in
consequence, the last bastion of linguistic theory of norms is destroyed.13 
26 It must be stressed that this theory of norms is non-cognitivistic because any normative
decision  is  exterior  relative  to  the  normed  universe  of  actions,  and  performative
utterances expressing a normation are not descriptions of a universe of actions. 
 
5 A formal analysis of normative regulation 
27 Let Cn(X) denote the set of all finite, consistent, independent, non-tautological subsets of
L and Cn(K) — the set of all subsets of K – {Wr}, i.e. the set of all subsets of K minus the real
world. Let f be a normative function. By normative function f, I mean a mapping from Cn(
X) to Cn(K), such that if X = {OA1, …, OAm} ∈ Cn(X) and K = {W1, ..., Wn} ∈ Cn(K), then f(X) = K
, if and only if, for any Ai, Wj(1 ≤ i ≤ m, l ≤ j ≤ n), V(Al, Wj) = 1. By a norm I mean any ordered
pair <OAi, Kl>, where OAi ∈ X and for any W ∈ Kl, V(Ai, W) = 1. We can observe that if f(X) =
K and n1, …, nm are norms, then K = K1 ∩ … ∩ Km. This equality establishes a connection
between normative functions and norms. 
28 A normative function is a formal counterpart of decisions about division of the real world
into  sections:  obligatory,  forbidden,  and  indifferent.  Simultaneously,  any  normative
function defines a suitable range of deontic alternativeness relation R. Thus, we can say
that a range of R consists of the postulated worlds with respect to normative function f. It
explains in what a sense the deontic sentences are true or false: they have a logical value
relative  to  a  given  normative  function  f.  No  special  semantics  or  logic  of  norms  is
necessary as the foundation for logical connections between deontic sentences. We can
speak about manifold relations between the norms as ordered pairs of a type <OAi, Kl>. For
example, the norms <OA, K> and <O~A, K) are mutually incompatible, but incompatibility
in this sense is not a logical relation, but an algebraic one. 
29 In this way, the Jørgensen’s dilemma may be solved — all that is needed for the analysis of
normative discourse can be reduced to normative functions and deontic sentences. The
non-cogitivistic character of all construction is now better visible than by the informal
analysis — the normative function is quite exterior (from the logical point view) to Wr. It
is imposed into the real world by normative authority. 
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6 Deontic propositions 
30 The nature of propositions is often explained via the notion of possible worlds.14 Roughly
speaking, if A is a sentence, then the proposition expressed by A is the class of all possible
worlds in which sentence A is true. The application of the above idea to deontic sentences
is straightforward: a deontic proposition expressed by a deontic sentence holding in the
real world is the set of all postulated worlds with respect to some normative function.
Deontic propositions defined in that manner can be treated as meanings or intensions of
deontic sentences. This idea is related to the conception of normative meaning proposed
by Jerzy Wróblewski.15 He identifies the meaning of norm (as a sentence) with “pattern of
right  behaviour”.  The  evident  difference  between  Wróblewski’s  and  my  conceptual
schemes lies in the absence of norms as sentences in the second scheme, but there are no
obstacles  resulting  from  deontic  propositions  being  viewed  as  “patterns  of  right
behaviour”. 
 
7 Concluding remarks 
31 The  non-linguistic  theory  of norms  raises,  of  course,  a  series  of  problems.  Formal
counterparts  of  decision  normations  are  abstract  objects,  defined  in  set  theoretical
language and, hence, are open to criticism from a nominalistic point of view. Another
problem is concerned with the nature of possible, and a fortiori, postulated worlds. What
are  these  worlds:  real  objects,  conceptual  constructs,  intentional  entities,  Platonistic
ideas?  Thus,  there  are  many possibilities  for  answering this  question.  But  these  two
problems  (and  others  not  mentioned  here)  are  common  to  all  formal  constructions
concerned with logical analysis. The non-linguistic theory of norms uses abstract objects,
but  they  are  well-defined  in  standard  logical  vocabulary.  I  think  this  counts  as  an
argument in favour of this theory. 
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NOTES
1. Arguments from priority of “weak permission” are described in Opałek and Woleński 1973 and
Woleński 1980b.
2. Von Wright 1951. I use the version due to Føllesdal and Hilpinen 1971.
3. I.e. the rule of detachment.
4. The conditions imposed on X are related to the notion of rational legislator introduced in
Nowak 1969.
5. I shall use the ideas of Kripke 1963 and 1965.
6. These matters are elaborated in Hanson 1965.
7. See Opałek 1970.
8. Woleński 1977 and 1980a.
9. Jørgensen 1938: 290.
10. Åqvist 1973: 131.
11. See Black 1963.
12. For motivation, see Opałek and Woleński 1973.
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13. For  a grounding  of  the  view  that  decision  formulation  is  an indicative  sentence,  ideas
contained in Åqvist 1973 can be used.
14. See Cresswell 1971, more sophisticated treatment is contained in Cresswell 1973.
15. Wróblewski 1964.
ABSTRACTS
This paper introduces a non-linguistic theory of norms. The proposal is  motivated jointly by
Jørgensen’s dilemma and Black’s objection to the better-known linguistic theories of norms. The
argument is structured as follows. The author starts by defining deontic sentence and deontic
system. He then applies Kripke’s possible world semantics to the analysis of deontic language,
before he presents the above-mentioned motivations for conceiving of norms as non-linguistic
entities.  One such conception is  defended in the second half  of  the paper,  where norms are
identified with decisions of  some normative authority.  The author shows how this  notion of
norm serves both, an intuitive and a formal analysis of normative regulation. Together with the
notion of  normative  function as  its  formal  counterpart,  this  notion of  norm permits  one to
explain  logical  relations  between  deontic  sentences  with  no  need  to  recur  to  any  special
semantics or logic of norms. | This is a corrected reprint of the text originally published in Reports
on Philosophy 6 (1982): 65–73. 
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